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demonstrated disputed issues of material fact regarding the impact of
fresh water release onto the mortgaged property, thereby leading to a
defense of equitable estoppel).
AJ.S., Inc. ("AJ.S.") defaulted on its United States Government
("Government") mortgage payments. The Government claimed no
factual dispute regarding AJ.S.'s obligation to pay and filed a summary
judgment motion, thus allowing the Government to foreclose on the
mortgage. In response, AJ.S. argued that because its inability to pay
resulted directly from Government misrepresentation within the loan
agreement's Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS"), this fact
estopped the Government from mortgage foreclosure.
The EIS stated the release of fresh water from the Caernarvon
Fresh Water Diversion Project ("the Project") would neither adversely
affect nor impact the mortgaged property. AJ.S. relied on the
Government representations and took the proceeds from the loan to
develop an oyster habitat, plant oyster seedlings, and construct a reef
on the Project leases. However, the fresh water flow was greater than
the EIS anticipated and the value of the oyster leases plunged.
Accordingly, AJ.S. proffered the affidavits of two witnesses as
corroboration of its defense. Furthermore, plans to depose the
witnesses were in place at the time the Government filed the summary
judgment motion.
The court found AJ.S. demonstrated disputed issues of material
fact concerning its defense of equitable estoppel. Therefore, the court
held the Government's attempt to dispose of the case prior to the
depositions was premature and denied the summary judgment motion.
Kimberley E. Montanaro
L.B. Corp. v. Schweitzer-Mauduit Int'l, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 147 (D.
Mass. 2000) (holding, unless the parties were in commercial
transaction, Massachusetts General Law chapter 93A was inapplicable
to claims arising from: (1) subsurface pumping of a well that caused
damage to the adjacent property's building; and (2) unfair or
deceptive business practices).
L.B. Corp. ("L.B.") brought a diversity action seeking
compensatory damages in the amount of $400,000 from SchweitzerMauduit
Corp.
("Schweitzer")
and
Kimberly-Clark
Corp.
("Kimberly"). In 1984, Kimberly sold the Valley Industrial Park, a
fifteen-acre parcel, to L.B. Kimberly's subsidiary, Schweitzer, owned
the Valley Mill Landfill adjacent to the Valley Industrial Park. L.B.
claimed improper pumping of a Kimberly well ("Well No. 5") in 1993
caused its buildings to subside twelve inches and resulted in repeated
costly repairs between 1995 and 1998. In 1997, the Massachusetts
Department of Environmental Protection informed L.B. that volatile
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organic compounds ("VOCs") contaminated its well water. L.B.
brought suit in Massachusetts federal district court, and claimed
Kimberly and Schweitzer illegally disposed hazardous material into the
landfill. Kimberly sought partial summary judgment on L.B.'s first
eight complaints.
First, Kimberly argued a three-year statute of limitations barred
L.B.'s claims. In 1996, L.B. stated the buildings' worth was zero.
Kimberly argued L.B.'s failure to sue for damages prior to 1996 barred
the current claim. The court disagreed, and stated that L.B. had a
right to sue. The court held the damages incurred in the years prior
to 1996 did not bar L.B. claims for damages sustained after 1996.
Second, Kimberly moved for summary judgment on count seven.
L.B. claimed the operation of Well No. 5 exceeded the state safe yield
requirement. Under Massachusetts General Law chapter 93A, sections
2 and 11 ("Chapter 93A"), a violation will occur if the operation
constitutes an unfair or deceptive business practice. The court stated
Chapter 93A was a consumer protection law concerning transactions,
and not a general protection against unfair business practices. The
court found Chapter 93A did not apply because the complaint
concerned the illegal pumping of a well, and not unfair or deceptive
Because L.B. and Kimberly were not in a
business practices.
transactional relationship, the court held L.B. failed to state a claim for
which the court could grant relief.
In count eight, L.B. asserted two claims under Chapter 93A. First,
L.B. asserted Kimberly's failure to disclose the possible groundwater
L.B. produced an
contamination violated Chapter 93A.
Environmental Protection Agency preliminary assessment, a former
Kimberly employee's statement, and an inter-office memorandum as
evidence that, at the time of the sale of Valley Industrial Park,
Kimberly knew VOC's might have contaminated the groundwater.
Kimberly argued the non-disclosure did not harm L.B. Additionally,
Kimberly argued the harm was not foreseeable because it had not
drilled any wells until after the sale. The court ruled a violation of
Chapter 93A would occur if Kimberly knew of actual contamination,
and its disclosure of the contamination would have led L.B. not to buy
the property. The court concluded L.B.'s evidence did not amount to
actual contamination of the parcel. The court also determined
Kimberly knew of, at most, a potential contamination. However,
without evidence of actual and present contamination, Kimberly was
not subject to a Chapter 93A violation. As a result, the court granted
Kimberly's motion for partial summary judgment on this claim.
L.B.'s second claim of count eight stated that Kimberly caused the
contamination of L.B.'s groundwater in violation of Chapter 93A. The
court also granted Kimberly's motion for partial summary judgment
because no commercial transaction regarding the contamination
existed. The court found Kimberly had no actual knowledge that the
land was contaminated at the time of the sale. Therefore, Kimberly
had not sold L.B. contaminated land. The evidence showed the
contamination occurred after Kimberly purchased the land and drilled
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the wells. The court determined the action did not trigger Chapter
93A because contamination occurred subsequent to the commercial
transaction.
Finally, L.B. sought to impose strict liability against Kimberly for
the subsidence of its buildings that resulted from the overpumping of
Well No. 5. Kimberly contended the subsurface pumping could not
result in strict liability. The court agreed and granted summary
judgment in favor of Kimberly. The court explained that removal of
lateral support by excavation might trigger strict liability, but in this
case, the act was subsurface pumping and not excavation. In cases of
subsurface pumping, the court stated negligence is the appropriate
legal standard.
In conclusion, the court held the statute of limitations precluded
two of the counts, decided three of the Chapter 93A counts in favor of
Kimberly, and denied all others motions for partial summary
judgment.
Jon Hyman
United States v. Michigan, 122 F. Supp. 2d 785 (E.D. Mich. 2000)
(ordering the Army Corps of Engineers to accept dredged materials
from Conner Creek at its Pointe Mouillee Confined Disposal facility at
Lake Erie).
The State of Michigan instigated an action after the Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps") refused to accept Conner Creek dredged material
at the Corps' Pointe Mouillee Confined Disposal Facility ("Point
Mouillee"). The court issued an order compelling the Corps to accept
Conner Creek's dredged materials.
Pursuant to a 1974 agreement with the United States, Michigan
constructed a confined disposal facility at Point Mouillee, Lake Erie.
The disposal facility contained dredged materials from the Detroit and
Rouge Rivers. In 1977, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") sued Michigan, the Detroit Water and Sewerage
Department ("DWSD"), and all communities and agencies under
contract with DWSD for violating the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The
parties submitted and the court approved a Consent Judgment. Later,
in 1997, DWSD reported violations of its National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System permit to the Michigan Department of
Environmental Quality ("MDEQ"). As a result of the violation, MDEQ,
DWSD, and other parties to the original Consent Judgment entered
into a Second Amended Consent Judgment again approved by this
court. The Second Amended Consent Judgment required DWSD to
dredge sediment from Conner Creek. Point Mouillee was the only
reasonable option for disposal of the dredged material. MDEQ,
DWSD, and the Corps attempted negotiations concerning the
deposition of the dredged materials into Point Mouillee, but were
unable to agree. The issue were: (1) whether the disposal facility's
acceptance of Conner Creek dredged material was a new use of Point

